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**Developments in Yemen & the new transformation project**

**COALITION FORCES WITHDRAWAL  
FROM THE WEST COAST.  
A REPOSITIONING OR A HUNT  
FOR A NEW LEGITIMACY?**



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## Introduction

The Coalition's failure in Yemen after more than seven years of war is considered today as one of the issues that enjoy almost unanimity among studies centers, experts and specialists, but the real dilemma of the coalition does not lie in failure only, but in that it entered the war with a zero probability of non-victory and achieving goals, and this is what makes solutions in front of it now Almost non-existent as a price it must pay for the absence of an exit strategy from the war.

In war sciences and politics, the exit strategy means the available alternative to confront the failure of the bets that remain in hypothetically estimated probability ratios set by decision makers and plan masters. No matter how high the success rates are, plans engineers must put a minimum percentage of failure possibilities. Every war and every confrontation carries a miscalculation, changes in data and surprises. America's war in "Iraq" and "Afghanistan" and before that the "Vietnam" war are all clear evidence of that, as well as the "July war" on Lebanon in 2006, and most importantly the war on "Syria", to which the US mobilized all capabilities and all alliances yet failed to achieve its goals <sup>[1]</sup>.

Lately, many indicators and proves shows that Western countries supervising the «Decisive Storm» and have shared interests with it were forced to apply some changes in policies. Among these indicators was the international movements under the pretext of "peace and stopping the war", but the problem of these international movements - US and UK in particular - was the fragmentation of Yemeni components and forces supported by the international forces and their allies in the region, that in addition to the unification of "Sana'a front" politically and militarily to confront any options wanted by the coalition and its international allies. This forced the coalition's side first to re-arranging its allies' situation in Yemen to confront those it classifies as opponents and enemies. These arrangements eliminate centers and shift influence, so whoever was at the fore must return to the back, and whoever was behind advances to the forefront of the scene at the level of coalition leaders and proxies in

Yemen. Now the UAE is to replace Saudi Arabia, not only in Yemen, but also in Libya, Sudan, Syria and Ethiopia, and Yemen is what matters to Majal Forum in this paper.

During the past period, many indications of shifting leadership in Yemen emerged, that shows clearly from shifting power from the failed Saudi proxies (The legitimate government and Muslim Brotherhood), as described by the project's sponsors, to the UAE proxies (The transitional council, UAE backed "elites" militia, and "belts forces" in the southern governorates) as well as the pro-Emirati "conference party" branch led by «Tariq Muhammad Abdullah», the nephew of former Yemeni President "Ali Abdullah Saleh".

## **A view on Yemen after seven years of war**

Saudi-led military intervention's failure in Yemen after more than six years ago was not a true reflection of the battle nature and the balance of power between the various conflict parties. In fact, the battle appears to be unequal, given the Saudi military superiority, which is matched by the limited armament of the Yemeni army and the popular committees affiliated with Sana'a government, regardless of the "human element" efficiency in Sana'a side and vice versa, the "human element" efficiency of the coalition armies and allied Yemeni forces. This failure was due to several factors that reflect a deep crisis in the Saudi strategic mind, which has turned into a chronic approach that cannot be changed, except in the event of major regional transformations and successive shocks in the Kingdom, which sits on a massive lake of oil that arouses ambitions and disputes between wings of the ruling family more than it arouses ambitions of conflicting international powers over interests and influence <sup>[2]</sup>.

Perhaps the first of these transformations is what Saudi Arabia has experienced during the past seven years in the Yemeni arena, not last of which was when the Yemeni Army backed by the "People's Committees" affiliated with Sana'a government managed to retrieve and control most

of the northern governorates, specifically “Marib Governorate” that is a stone through from falling down under Sana’a forces control.

«Marib» strategic importance lies on oil it contains, besides being the historical capital of Yemen, that in addition to its moral place as the last stronghold of Hadi’s government supported by the coalition in northern Yemen. All that gives the battle to regain and control “Marib” a strategic and political dimensions in the course of the war waged by the Saudi coalition on Yemen since Years.

## The coalition’s announced objectives

Since the beginning of «Decisive Storm» operations, the coalition leadership announced major goals for which the war took place. We can identify them in: Bringing back what it called «legitimacy» led by the outgoing Yemeni President «Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi» to the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, after accusing the 21 September revolution’s leadership of executing a coup against him, more than six months after the “revolution”, and after all parties, including the “legitimate government” signed the “peace and partnership agreement” with the revolution’s leadership. The completely ignored question that the coalition didn’t care less about, which had a fundamental influence on the course of the war, and even its failure, was: What authority did Saudi Arabia wanted to restore?

It does not seem that Saudi Arabia, the USA and the «Coalition Command» discussed this very important, articulate, and perhaps fundamental idea in the Yemeni interior – Where the authority that Saudi Arabia wanted to bring back with this aggressive military campaign does not mean anything to millions of Yemeni citizens, because the authority that has been installing since 2012, through the Gulf initiative, had not built a good relation with citizens in the north, south and center. It had not succeeded in attracting popular support what so ever, as it is a nascent authority and the people have not yet understood, including “Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi” who ran alone without a competitor in the 2012 “mock

elections”. It is important to mention here that he did not get a single vote in the southern governorates; due to the separatist movement growth, and therefore those who will be active on the ground are mostly supportive party groups of the Muslim Brotherhood, and others were formed later <sup>[3]</sup>.

This factor was one of the decisive factors that kept the coalition mere warplanes bombing, killing and destroying. On the ground there was a very simple military movement, however, the bet was on this action, as warplanes were an air cover for fighters who control and restore the cities and governorates they lost, so Saudi Arabia in this sense was completely ignorant of the reality, or at least it had a wrong assessment and reversal of results that determined from the first sight that the coalition is going to complete failure <sup>[4]</sup>.

## The Arab world and Iran

It is not possible to find out to what extent Saudi Arabia and the coalition it leads were convinced that marketing the idea of restoring Yemen to the “Arabs” Arms and defeating «Iran» in Yemen - as a slogan for the military campaign that was more prominent than the slogan of the alleged «restoration of legitimacy» - would be significant and attract pro-coalition polarization! <sup>[5]</sup>.

It is clear that the military campaign title produced counterproductive results, as it was confirming once again that the Saudi justifications for war on the neighbouring Arab country are incorrect, illegal, unacceptable and even very repulsive. All Yemenis cannot find “Iran” in this mess, rather, they see that their country is being bombed and destroyed and that Saudi Arabia is committing massacres. At the same time most Yemenis consider “Ansar Allah” as an authentic and main component in this country, and no one is willing to look at them in a Saudi/American eye, so it was also difficult for Saudi Arabia to open camps to recruit fighters against Iran and to fight “for the sack of the Arab brothers” as well as stirring the feelings of Yemeni political currents and wings on this fabricated and

newly born train. If study centers conducted a public opinion poll on the idea: How many are hostile to Iran in Yemen? it would not find a figure on which Saudi Arabia and the coalition could build its media campaign for a military intervention to suffocate a country that needed help to get out of the crisis and not enter into a war <sup>[6]</sup>.

That is why the seventh year of the war is nearing its end without achieving those declared goals. Rather, what happened was the opposite on two tracks:

**First:** The emergence of goals many Yemenis consider as the real goals of the war, through sharing areas of influence and wealth in Yemen between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

**Second:** The announced goals have become impossible today, and talking about them is a fantasy, not because of the strength and steadfastness of Sanaa and its ability to control many of the areas that the coalition and its allies had controlled during the first three years of the war, but because of the comprehensive failure of the coalition and those on his side on all the military, political, security and economic aspects.

## First: Military failure

Since the first months of the war, and away from the consumerist slogans promoted by the coalition, there have been real paths drawn on the ground determined by the real goals and strategic ambitions on the basis of which the coalition launched its war on Yemen. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia led its field path from the eastern regions (Marib, Hadhramaut, Al-Mahra) to move towards Sana'a, while the second factor in the coalition, which was the UAE, led the second path from (Aden, the Yemeni coasts, ports and islands), these two tracks were accompanied by the fact that each of the coalition countries hired a Yemeni "team" that is absolutely loyal to it. Saudi Arabia established a brigade that contained the so-called "legitimate government", including the Islah party (the Muslim Brotherhood), as well as Qaeda and ISIS, according to what was mentioned by more than one

report by many international news agencies, such as the BBC and others. On the other side, the UAE used many southern powers, as a mixture of several southern forces, some of which have religious orientations, such as the takfiri (terrorist) organizations that declared jihad under the coalition flag, against those they called “Raafidis and Maguos” (In refer to Ansar Allah), next to recruiting forces under “human rights demands” pretext such as justice and fairness.

This mixture is what appeared later, specifically in 2017, under the name of the “Southern Transitional Council” (STC) backed by the Emirates, which in turn rolls and exercises its powers in Aden and some southern governorates independently of the Saudi-backed Hadi government <sup>[7]</sup>.

On the other hand, the Arab coalition’s calculations with the local Yemeni parties have changed, especially the UAE, the biggest enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, which moved towards supporting political and military entities independent of the “legitimate government”. After supporting the STC that calls for separation, it supported Brigadier General «Tariq Saleh», who shifted positions from confronting the Arab coalition to cooperating with it, after the killing of his uncle, former Yemeni President «Ali Abdullah Saleh», at the hands of the Houthis on December 4th, 2017 <sup>[8]</sup>.

## **Second: Failed model presented in areas controlled by the legitimate government**

The collapsed reality in the governorates controlled by the coalition forces and legitimate government is now facing a continuous economic deterioration, absence of basic services, security chaos, and siege on the so-called (legitimate government) with the fact that it is prevented from its presence and sovereign duty at home (Adan). At the same time the imposition of an additional coup reality through the militias created and supported by the coalition. This, in itself, ends the existence of the state and its institutions and all the elements of its economic revival, from exporting



oil and gas or benefiting from airports and ports revenues and handing them over either to the militias created by the coalition, or controlling them through Emirati or Saudi military units <sup>[9]</sup>.

### Third: Economic Failure

In September 2021, most areas under the coalition and its allies control in Yemen witnessed violent protests; Denouncing the accelerating deterioration of the local currency, rise in prices, and the complete collapse of public services. In Aden and other southern cities such as Hadramawt, Shabwa and Abyan, the demonstrators ended in occupying official sites and buildings, and the densely populated «Taiz Governorate» witnessed demonstrations for several days. Protesters blamed the Saudi-Emirati coalition for the national currency collapse, accusing it of disrupting ports, confiscating the government's decision, and preventing it from exporting oil and gas.

According to UN reports, the continued depreciation of the Yemeni riyal and the rise in prices have exacerbated the state of hunger in Yemen, where about 16.2 million people face food insecurity this year. Food prices have risen by nearly 60% in some areas of Yemen since the beginning of this year; As the Yemeni riyal collapsed, and already insufficient food consumption doubled – as measured by the hunger barometer tracked by the WFP – in areas under controlled by the internationally recognized government, where food became prohibitively expensive, the value of the riyal collapsed by nearly 40% in exchange for US dollar in the first 8 months of 2021, exceeding 1,000 Yemeni riyals for one US dollar for the first time ever. Today the US dollar exchange rate crossed 1,500 Yemeni riyals barrier <sup>[10]</sup>.

It was striking that the opposite of what is happening in areas under the coalition and its Yemeni allies control, is happening in the areas under Sana'a authority control, which was able to maintain the exchange rate of the dollar within the limits of 600 riyals to the dollar, although according

to official statements by leaders in Sana'a that their areas are subject to a strict siege where they do not have any strong economic ally as in the case of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi Yemeni allies.

#### **Fourth: Redrawing the political map according to field variables**

«Marib battle» forced all international forces participating in the coalition to appear directly and lead the scene; In an effort to deprive Sana'a of control over “Marib” and expel the forces allied with it from the strategic governorate, which - according to dozens of international reports - has become “militarily” in under control after Sana'a forces managed to retrieve 12 out of 14 districts in Marib governorate, where only the «Wadi» and «Marib City» districts remain. But can international efforts manage the situation and compete with time? To remedy what can be remedied, especially with the Sana'a forces rush to liberate the remainder of the governorate before entering into any future negotiations.

However, according to an analysis presented by researcher Dr. “Gregory D. Johnson”, a former member of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, to the Institute for Gulf States Studies in Washington, entitled: “The Empty US Toolbox in Yemen”, the dynamics in Marib set the United States in a difficult position. The US has no leverage with the Houthis, sanctions failed, strongly worded statements from the US and the UN fall on deaf ears, and direct US military involvement is not the first. Houthis see no reason to compromise or negotiate. They rightly believe that they are winning on the battlefield, and that if they continue to press in Marib, they can eventually seize oil and gas fields and secure an independent state led by the Houthis themselves<sup>[11]</sup>.

When it comes to Yemen, the options for the United States are not available. One of two things is about to happen, either the US will need outside help from Iran; To persuade the Houthis to stop their attack before the fall of Marib, or that the Houthis will take Marib, and press south to

Shabwa <sup>[12]</sup>.

In turn, «Britain» was not absent from the Yemeni scene, as it was more daring in its approach in Yemen. Its ambassador to Yemen, «Richard Oppenheim» explicitly declared that the political settlement in Yemen needs a new UN resolution, given that Resolution 2216 has expired. Does this mean that the actual end of the Yemen war is nearing reality?

In an interview with the Saudi “Asharq Al-Awsat” newspaper, “Oppenheim” said, «A gap has occurred between the content of Resolution (2216) issued by the UNSC in 2015, and the situation on the ground that changes daily,» noting that «this will be reflected in any upcoming political settlement». At the same time, it is likely that «the new UN envoy will present a comprehensive peace plan with all speed and seriousness»<sup>[13]</sup>.

The British official expressed his country's new position by saying: «I think that any political settlement between the parties needs a new decision that reflects this settlement, but the decision must be reflected in the settlement and not the other way around. It is possible to talk about the decision content before the settlement, and I am sure that the international community is ready for a new decision at the appropriate time to give international legitimacy to a settlement between the parties, and this is the job of the UN Special Envoy, because he represents the international community in this regard.

This clear and explicit position of London regarding the reality of UN Resolution (2216), is considered the first position of its kind for a country that is part of the International Quartet (UK, US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) concerned with the war in Yemen. Not only that, but the British diplomat held the government of President “Hadi” responsible for the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, where he said: «Providing basic services to Yemenis and paying employees' salaries is the responsibility of the Yemeni government through the revenues it receives», describing the current humanitarian situation in Yemen as «very frightening, and portends a famine». Adding that “many people do not have the ability to buy food”<sup>[14]</sup>.

This British position follows the initiative that the US special envoy to Yemen, «Timothy LenderKing», brought to Muscat, but London's position appears bolder and more frank than Washington's <sup>[15]</sup>.

Undoubtedly, the international movement in the UNSC since last September until today, including condemning the five permanent members of what they called (the Houthi attack on Marib) and the subsequent field movement represented by bilateral visits by the US envoy to Yemen, and others by the UN envoy to the region and then to Yemen, where the beginning was from Aden city, and from there to Taiz, within a few days, all of which came within the framework of international attempts (UK & US) - after their direct proxies in the war failed - to ease the weight of the successive achievements achieved by Sanaa, and deprive it of reaping the full fruit of those achievements, By holding the Saudi coalition and the so-called "legitimate government" responsible for the successive failures of more than two years in Yemen, and moving to execute plan (B) represented in pushing the STC and many southern factions and components, especially from (Shabwa, Hadramout and Al-Mahra) in addition to "Tariq Saleh" and "The Political Bureau», which announced its establishment in March of this year as new entities, replacing Hadi and Eslah party (The Muslim brotherhood).

However, this option is burdened with many difficult challenges, given that the substitutes are very much politically and militarily weaker than the previous parties, and their presence in the "public memory" is not positive, despite having something of positivity for a small group people. In addition to that, there is the past accumulations and the different orientations and goals of each party, not to mention their complete absence from the fields of "state institutions" required in this stage, or even political movements in all their simple and complex concepts <sup>[16]</sup>.

In the midst of this intertwined Yemeni scene, a number of media outlets and international news agencies published news about the «Saudi forces withdrawal» from southern Yemen, in light of the departure of its forces located in the «Coalition Forces Command base» in Al-Sha'ab area in the

Buriqa district, west of Aden, with transferring their vehicles, armored vehicles, and military equipment to the Saudi vessel “Durra Jeddah” docking in the “oil port” before leaving the city amid strict security measures, which included closing several streets, and the landing of a cargo plane at Aden Airport to pick up the troops. While similar reports were reported during the recent period about the withdrawal of Saudi forces from Military bases in Shabwa and Lahj governorates <sup>[17]</sup>.

As a result of these moves and the state of Saudi confusion and ambiguity, many media organizations saw in this Saudi move, including international news agency «Reuters», that Saudi Arabia is withdrawing or considering withdrawal, so they took initiative to obtain information directly from the military spokesman of the Saudi Ministry of Defense, Colonel “Turki Al-Maliki” , who, in turn, denied the withdrawal idea, stressing that this comes within the framework of a «redeployment» and that «the reports regarding a Saudi military withdrawal from southern Yemen are baseless and simply incorrect». Adding that these steps came «based on the operational and tactical assessment that all military forces apply constantly in every country» <sup>[18]</sup>.

The political leadership of Sana’a front was aware of what was going on, but preferred monitoring the Saudi movements using the intelligence services it possessed. According to information obtained by “Majal Forum” from private sources, the reality of the «withdrawal» is nothing more than a repositioning and redeployment of the coalition forces, and what explains this is the Sana’a affiliated media’s disregard for these Saudi and Emirati movements.

Saudi Arabia withdrew its forces from some locations in Mahra, according to what the Information confirms, and that was to avoid clashes and bumping heads with the local tribes. Saudi troops handed the locations over to the British forces, which recently sent additional troops, while Saudi forces remain in other locations in Mahra. What is being made in the ground is no more than switching roles, an exchange of positions, and sharing of influence, as evidenced by the UAE-Saudi exchange. Of course,

all this is taking place under US and UK oversight <sup>[19]</sup>.

The forum's sources suggest that Saudi and the UAE, and behind them the USA and the UK, are intending at this stage to move away from areas of direct conflict, in return for strengthening their military presence on the islands and sensitive sites, such as Midi coastal district, Socotra Island, Mukalla, Sayun Airport, Mayun Island, and Bab al-Mandab strait, with an intensive effort, specifically by the UAE, in rapprochement and coordination between the STC militias and colonel "Tariq Saleh", both supported by Abu Dhabi; aiming to fill the void that the "old man" (Eslah Party - Muslim Brotherhood) will leave after the liberation of Marib, especially the void in Taiz. That comes while Saudi Arabia maintains its dominance over the so-called "legitimate government" decisions, political position, and military command. Saudi Arabia is also pressuring Eslah in Taiz and some areas in the south adjacent to the northern governorates, to coordinate with «Tariq Saleh», his cousin «Ammar Saleh» and some southern Salafis, after the "Eslah" - the main component in the so-called «legitimate government» - lost its most important and last strongholds in the north (Marib) <sup>[20]</sup>.

In this context, many observers agree that there is a close connection between the US and international movements with what is happening, citing the visit of the UN envoy "Grandberg" to Aden and Taiz, as well as the US envoy "Tim Linder King" first visit to Aden, which they believe is aimed to give these factions a moral boost and give them a «legitimate» character; To be an alternative to the Eslah party and the so-called «legitimate government».

## Withdrawal from Hodeidah

Out of a sudden, and without warning, and at the prime of Yemeni scene intertwining and the increase in ambiguity indicators that are difficult for the observer to dismantle its parts form the full picture... Came the withdrawal of the UAE-backed forces led by «Tariq Saleh» from

Hodeidah governorate. On November 12th 2021, Many media outlets and international news agencies reported the withdrawal of coalition forces from Hodeidah governorate with all their military equipment, heading to «Mocha city» in Taiz, as well as towards Aden city.

The Saudi-UAE coalition decision to withdraw militias loyal to it from Hodeidah opened the door to speculation about the background and implications of this move, and whether it was linked in one way or another to the battles in Marib, whether in terms of anticipating the confrontation shifting to Yemen's southern and eastern coasts, or in terms of working to prepare an alternative stronghold for "Marib City", which seems to be recognized by the "coalition," and its Western sponsors, that Sana'a forces control over it is very soon. The other option is that this move came as a "goodwill gesture" from the coalition toward Sanaa; To tempt it to stop what it says is the operation to "liberate Marib», next to joining the dialogue table, which it considers futile after seven years of war and the failure of all previous rounds of dialogue.

It was also remarkable that the withdrawal came one day after a visit by the UN envoy to Yemen, «Hans Grundberg» to the west coast, where he met the nephew of former president «Ali Abdullah Saleh», "Tariq Saleh". As following to that visit was what the «joint forces» - stationed on the west coast and the outskirts of Hodeidah city - received of urgent orders from the Emirati officer, "Abu Khalifa" (Saeed Al-Muhairi) to withdraw back to the city of Mocha <sup>[21]</sup>.

Sources told "Majal Forum" that «Al-Ammaleqah Brigades» led by Brigadier General «Abu Zara'a Al-Muharrami», and «Infantry Brigades» led by the former Minister of Defense Major General «Haitham Qassem Taher» withdrew with all their military equipment from large areas on the outskirts of Hodeidah city, most notably: Al-Saleh, Kilo 16, Ekhoan Thabet Commercial Complex, and other areas in Al-Durayhimi district. Some of these forces were assigned to be stationed on the outskirts of Al-Durayhimi towards the southern districts of the governorate, while "Al-Ammaleqah" Fifth and Sixth Brigades were notified to move to Aden city.

The sudden withdrawal did not pass without objections from some forces participating in the coalition. The «Tahami Brigades», which most of whose members belong to the districts south of Hodeidah, refused to evacuate their positions. Following that immediate orders were issued to them by the coalition's leadership to implement immediately, threatening them with air strikes in the event that they insisted on violating orders.

In the context of multiple explanations for the withdrawal, high-ranking military and political sources confirmed to “Majal Forum” that there is a Saudi-UAE consensus with blessing from both the US and the UK, and with Israeli encouragement to exit the war in Yemen after the Saudi-UAE coalition was defeated in the war against «Sana'a forces», which has become the party with the upper militarily and politically. With that being said, getting out of the war in a way that does not make “Riyadh” and “Abu Dhabi” seem defeated, requires reshaping the military map in Yemen, according to what is decreed in (Plan B) supervised by the UK.

In the this context, the parliamentarian representing «Hodeidah bloc», who is loyal to the government of outgoing President «Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi», Mr. «Mohammed Warq», talks about the start of implementing what he described as «An international agreement aimed at closing the Hodeidah city file» noting that «the agreement requires that Tariq's forces remain in Mocha to protect international corridors,” referring to Bab al-Mandab, and “preparing a new geographical map that includes granting between 23- kilometers east of the western coast, and along the Tuhami coast front from “Khoukha” to “Al-Durayhimi”, for the benefit of “Tariq's forces”, With keeping Durayhimi as a military contact area with Sana'a forces <sup>[22]</sup>.

He added that «the process of separating the forces will be carried out with walls of barbed wire, and the agreement includes the withdrawal of the “Tihami brigades” to Al-Wazi'iyah in preparation for launching a military operation on Taiz.

Information obtained by “Majal Forum” were not far from what was published by “Al-Mayadeen TV” - affiliated with Iran-led resistance axis



- which quoted unnamed Yemeni sources - but certain to be high-ranking sources - Given the good relations between the channel and Sana'a authorities... The source said that the withdrawal of the Saudi coalition forces from the western coast of Al-Hodeidah comes due to the US and UAE concern about the developments in Marib, which is located to the northeast of the capital, Sana'a.

The sources reported that the coalition withdrew from the coastal region after learning that liberating the coast is «The strategy coming after the liberation of Marib», and that the coalition forces want to arrange its position now in the south, in anticipation of a crushing military defeat. The sources also revealed that «the coalition withdrew all its forces, including «Tariq Saleh» forces and Al-Ammaleqah Brigades from the coast towards Aden. Adding that «the army and the popular committees have completely taken control of the coast, and the confrontations are currently taking place in “Al-Khoukha and Hays” districts. This information was confirmed by a private military sources to “Majal Forum” earlier this month.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE joint forces on the western coast of Yemen issued a statement, saying: «The evacuation came within the framework of implementing the “Sweden agreement”, which obligates the forces to demilitarized these areas and maintain it safe for civilians. However, the statement, which was supposed to remove the mystery of the withdrawal, increased the volume of questions raised, as how do those forces implement the “Stockholm” agreement agreed upon since 2018, precisely now, at a time when the battles are intensifying, and the two sides are engaged in a decisive battle in Marib? And how these forces vacate positions; With the aim of making it demilitarized, while the forces of Sanaa are advancing and replacing them in those areas?

Meanwhile, the UN, which is the sponsor of the Sweden agreement, said that it was not informed by any party regarding the withdrawal process, and that it only learned about it through the media, knowing that the international team supervising the agreement is still stationed off the coast of Hodeidah, and has direct contacts with all parties on the west coast. In

turn, the government of outgoing President “Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi” considered that «the withdrawal of coalition forces from Hodeidah and the south of the governorate is taking place without the government team’s knowledge, as well as zero coordination».

According to the sources, the indications on the ground confirms that there is a consensus on granting the pro-UAE “Congress party” dominance in the south and under the guise of the STC, that along with merging «Tariq Saleh» fighters (mercenaries) with the fighters of the STC (ideologists, especially Salafis) and enabling them to gain military control of all southern governorates, in a move that aims to end any military presence for the Eslah party, provided that this becomes the map of the military distribution in Yemen when engaging in the political negotiating, which will include only (the north “represented by Ansar Allah and their allies”, and the south “represented by the STC and the pro-UAE Congress party”), and on this basis, political negotiations is to be adopted, along with what follows of resulting solution to stop the war in Yemen.

What “Majal Forum” can confirm, citing its own sources, is that indicators on the ground confirm: that there is a consensus on enabling the pro-Emirati “Congress current” to gain dominance in the south and under the STC guise, and by integrating “Tariq Saleh’s” fighters (with their religious, Salafi and materialistic sides) with the fighters of the STC (“belts” and “elites”) forces, affiliated with the UAE, especially (ideologues and those with Salafist orientations), next to enabling them to have full military control over all the southern governorates, and to end any military presence of what is called “legitimate government” in its two parts “Abd Rabbo” and “Eslah party”, provided that this military force stops any progress attempted by Sana’a forces in the southern governorates or in Taiz, as well as on pinning down/holding the map of this military distribution in Yemen when starting the political negotiations.

In conclusion: We can say that the new entities that the international forces supporting the coalition are working on : pushing to the fore in the Yemeni scene to replace the failed “legitimacy”, and to rearrange their

ranks, address their imbalances, eliminate the foci of conflict between their components and fuse them into a new component to lead the political and military scene; For the purpose of confronting “Sana’a front” and confronting its political and military project. The new project sees in Saudi Arabia, and with it what is called the “legitimate government”, with its two parts, «Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi» and «Eslah Party», and the «Al-Qaeda faction» loyal to them and to Saudi Arabia, as a complete sign of failure; Therefore, these parties will be the scapegoats for the new project. On the contrary, the UAE and its allies (the STC and some southern components, especially the “belts” and “elites” forces, and the UAE-backed wing of the Congress party led by “Tariq Saleh”, whom the owners of the new project are seen as key elements through which they can stop their strategic bleeding in Yemen.

However, the question that arises strongly is: “What is the possibility of this project’s success? And how realistic is it? And what are the guarantees for that? Especially in the phase that “Sana’a” is experiencing after controlling Marib, and what follows of unifying most northern regions under its control.

Therefore, international powers’ attempts to advance a peace or war process while adopting this equation may remain unrealistic, and it is difficult or even impossible for them to achieve the desired goal, especially in light of Sana’a’s possession of all political and military capabilities to resolve the whole battle of Yemen.

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

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